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I. To Lease or not to Lease : A_Comparison of "Traditional"
Indian Mineral Leases with other Structures for Minpr^l Development. ~  " ' '
A. The Statutes. Federal law requires consent of 
Congress to any conveyance of Indian lands. Two basic
modern statutes govern mineral development of Indian tribal 
lands: —
1. The Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938, 
codified as amended as 25 U.S.C. §§'396a-396g. In general, 
the 1938 Act permits leases of tribal lands for not to exceed 
a ten-year primary term and as long thereafter as minerals are 
produced in paying quantities. The Act requires competitive 
sales of oil and gas leases by public auction or sealed bids 
after appropriate notice. The Secretary^can reject all bids 
and readvertise oil and gas leases. (Alsop with consent of the 
tribe, an oil and gas lease may be negotiated without 
competitive bidding —  but only with the Secretary’s approval. 
Performance bonds must be furnished to assure compliance with
— A tribe developing its own minerals entirely by itself 
would not require any federal approval. However, if a tribe 
enters into a lease, or any kind of service or employment 
contract with an outside company or any non-Indian, that lease 
or contract would require federal approval. See 25 U.S.C. § 
81.
— These two statutes relate to tribal development of^ _
minerals. Leasing of individual Indian allotments for mining 
purposes is chiefly governed by 25 U.S.C. § 396.
lease terms. Leasing under the 1938 Act is also governed by 
fairly extensive Secretarial regulations.
2. Indian Mineral Development Act of 1982, 
codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2108. The 1982 Act authorizes 
leases or any other agreement such as a joint venture, 
operating, production sharing, service, or managerial 
agreement. Unlike, the 1938 Act, the 1982 statute does not 
require competitive bidding for oil and gas leases. An 
individual Indian holding a beneficial interest in mineral 
resources can include these in a tribal mineral agreement if 
the Secretary approves. In deciding whether to approve a 
minerals agreement under the 1982 Act, the Secretary shall 
consider the potential economic return to the tribe, the 
potential environmental, social and cultural effects of the 
agreement on the tribe and provisions for resolving disputes 
that may arise between the parties to the agreement.
B . Tax and Other Incentives to Develop Minerals on
Indian Lands.
1. Under the 1982 Act. A tribe is ordinarily not 
subject to any form of state taxation or state regulation, 
except in the very unusual circumstance where Congress has 
specifically authorized it. This should be the result 
wherever a tribe develops its own minerals.
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under the 1982 Act by entering into sn employment contract or 
service agreement with a non—Indian mineral company to sssist 
it, state severance, personal property, gross receipts and 
like taxes should not apply.
Under such an agreement, the non-Indian 
contract miner could lease equipment to the tribe or the tribe 
could purchase the equipment paying for it over time. 
Alternatively, by agreement the contract miner could 
contribute equipment to the joint venture with the tribe. A 
contract miner could also agree to provide other services.
There is strong authority for the proposition 
that the non-Indian contract miner would also not be subject 
to state taxation or state regulation on its share of the 
proceeds. E.g., New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 
U.S. 324 (1983); Ramah Navajo School Board v. Bureau of 
Revenue, 458 U.S. 832 (1982); White Mountain Apache Tribe v. 
Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980). However, these cases require 
that the courts undertake a "particularized inquiry" into any 
state interest supporting a regulation or particular tax, as 
against the federal and tribal interest in a tax or regulatory 
immunity. Thus, the exact outcome may turn on the fact 
situation of a particular case, and cannot be predicted with 
certainty.
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2. Under the 1938 Act. In a lease transaction, 
the result should be the same. The Supreme Court in 1988 
summarily affirmed the Ninth Circuit holding (819 F.2d 895) 
that the State of Montana could not impose its 30% coal 
severance tax on a mineral lessee of Crow coal. Montana v.
Crow Tribe, __ U.S. __, 98 L. Ed. 2d 638 (1988). It may be,
however, that the size of this particular tax militated 
heavily in favor of tribal immunity. It remains to be seen 
whether immunity will be the rule in all cases challenging 
state taxes on non-Indian mineral lessees. The Supreme Court 
has recently granted review Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. State of
New Mexico, __ 745 P.2d 11 (N.M. 1987) . In Cotton, the New
Mexico Court of Appeals held that the state taxes could be 
imposed.
3. Tribal taxes. In Cotton, the Tribe also taxed 
the production of minerals. This right has been confirmed. 
Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
If both the State and the Tribe can legally tax 
mineral extraction, and both do so, there is an obvious 
disincentive to develop Indian minerals. For example, Cotton 
Petroleum paid taxes (state and tribal) amounting to about 14 
percent of the value of its production. On non-Indian land, 
its state taxes would be about 8 percent of production. 
Moreover, the existence even of moderate state taxes as a 
practical matter limits the tax revenues a tribe can expect to
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receive and therefore the governmental services it can provide 
on the Reservation and for its people. (To illustrate, if New 
Mexico's 8 percent tax cannot legally be applied to Cotton, 
the tribe involved could raise its 6 percent tax to 8 percent 
and still be competitive with non-Indian lands.) Because of 
this result, I believe any state taxation of mineral 
extraction which a tribe also taxes impermissibly interferes 
with the authority of a tribe to govern itself. It remains to 
be seen whether the Court will agree.
The structure of the mineral development 
venture may have tribal tax implications as well. The tribe 
of course will not be taxing its own enterprise, so if -a 
tribal enterprise develops coal or oil and gas under the 1982 
Act, it would not be taxed. A lessee is, however, subject to 
tribal severance and other taxes. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache 
Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982). (Some tribes have agreed to 
tax-caps in mineral leases, but any kind of limitation on 
tribal taxation raises serious issues as to tribal sovereignty 
which are avoided if a tribal enterprise does the development 
with assistance of a contract miner under the 1982 Act.)
4. Regulatory implications. It is likely that 
state regulatory law also does not apply to tribal development 
of tribal minerals. Federal regulations (a) of general 
application, or (b) that specifically pertain to Indian 
minerals would generally be applicable. This immunity from
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state law may create particular incentives for Indian mineral 
development.
C. Tribal control. Some argue that joint ventures or 
service agreements that give tribes "a piece of the action" 
provide greater tribal control of the transaction. In theory, 
at least, there should not be greater tribal control under a 
1982 Act agreement than under a 1938 Act lease. In-either 
circumstance, the duties, powers and responsibilities of the 
parties are spelled out by the agreement -- be it a lease, a 
service agreement, a joint venture or a partnership. The 
governing document controls. Its terms are flexible. The 
Secretary, moreover, must approve both transactions, so both 
are subject to federal regulation.
D. Economic and financial implications. Tribes should 
think carefully about the economic implications of an oil and 
gas agreement under the 1982 Act. Competitive bidding in the 
1938 Act does provide protections. Even the best of experts 
may be wrong in a speculative field like oil and gas 
development. If the tribe develops its own oil and gas 
pursuant to a service contract, and hits a dry hole, the tribe 
takes nothing. By contrast, competitive bids under the 1938 
Act provide a front-end bonus, which can be substantial. With 
hardrock minerals, where the consequences of a mineral 
development are more predictable, a 1982 Act agreement is more 
attractive from the tribal standpoint.
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A joint venture, moreover, may require some tribal 
financial contribution —  in contrast to a more traditional 
lease where all the capital must be advanced and all the risk 
of loss borne by the non-Indian company. Of course, the 
extent of the Tribe's financial obligations are governed by 
the mineral agreement itself.
II. Other Issues.
A. Dispute resolution. However a mineral transaction 
is structured -- as a lease or otherwise -- thought needs to 
be given to dispute resolution. Tribes will surely resist 
state courts, and non-Indian companies may resist tribal 
courts -- although tribal courts are increasingly being 
recognized as forums for settlement of civil disputes.
Thought could be given to structuring a binding 
arbitration process. This was done in the Fort Peck Water 
Compact which will be discussed separately at the Conference. 
The Compact provides for binding arbitration by establishing a 
three-member board, one selected by the Tribe, the other by 
the State (in a mineral agreement, by the mineral company) and 
a third neutral selected by the two. The board can be 
empowered to hold hearings, subpoena witnesses and documents 
from the tribe and company, take evidence and reach written 
decisions on virtually every issue that could be subject to 
dispute. The parties can set time frames in which decisions
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must be reached in the agreement. The agreement can limit 
judicial review to simply enforcing the arbitrator's decision 
unless it was produced by fraud, corrpution or the like.
B. Employment issues. Indian preference or a set quota 
of jobs is likely to be of great importance to tribes. Union 
and other objectives are often important to companies. Any 
agreement must consider employment questions if the 
development is expected to be a significant source of jobs.
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